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High-frequency dataa b s t r a c t
We examine an unusual episode in the behavior of the euro, pound and yen exchange rate
markets when the dollar appreciated (depreciated) against the three major currencies, in
response to unfavorable (favorable) US growth news during the global financial crisis.
Contrary to the previous findings, we show that, for each currency pair, only a small subset
(about a third) of the most significant macro news effects reversed sign, primarily
announcements regarding consumption, credit, labor and housing markets. Our results
reveal that announcement chronology within a month matters, in that specifically the ear-
liest releases within an indicator category exhibit sign asymmetry.
 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Standard models of exchange rate determination predict that positive (negative) growth news tend to appreciate (depre-
ciate) the value of a country’s currency. However, the opposite can also occur, appreciating (depreciating) the exchange rate
in response to unfavorable (favorable) growth news, if for example, investors’ risk aversion is sufficiently large. Such an unu-
sual behavior of exchange rates has recently occurred during the global financial crisis (Fratzscher, 2009). Using a high fre-
quency dataset of the three major currency pairs (euro-dollar, pound-dollar, yen-dollar), we provide the first intraday
analysis of the composition and sources of the sign switch in the exchange-rate response to news coefficients during this
period. Contrary to the previous findings which rely on daily returns, we show that, for each currency pair, only a subset
(about a third) of the macro indicators’ effects reversed sign beginning in 2008, in particular announcements relating to
housing, credit and labor markets, which were at the epicenter of the financial crisis. The sign switch effect we document
is prevalent in all three markets, yet weaker in the yen-dollar currency pair.
We estimate the conditional mean response of 5-min returns between 2005 and 2012 following Andersen et al. (2003,
2007) and show that the news coefficient sign reversal is strongest for the consumer confidence, consumer price index
(CPI), new home sales, housing starts, initial claims, non-farm payroll employment and Fed funds rate announcements,
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kets. These results indicate a context-specific change in investors’ reaction to news and reveal that announcement chronol-
ogy within an indicator category matters for the sign switch effect to take place. Typically those announcements in a given
month that are the earliest releases within an indicator category, which contain incremental information about consumption,
real-estate and labor markets reveal sign asymmetry. Our results suggest that, given the sources and evolution of risk during
the 2008–2009 financial crisis, investors rationally paid more attention to the signals in the earliest, most informative
releases related to consumption, housing, credit and employment to collect new information about the potential changes
in the relevant market risks. We also explore various sources of macronews parameter instability suggested by the foreign
exchange literature and find that fluctuations in aggregate risk levels, carry trade returns and the Federal Reserve Bank’s
(Fed) interest rate policy explain most of the variation in news response coefficients.
Many papers have investigated the impact of macroeconomic news on exchange rate markets. However, the literature has
not reached a clear consensus on whether the exchange rate return reaction to news varies over time. For example, Andersen
et al. (2007), Faust et al. (2007) and Goldberg and Grisse (2013) suggest that time-variation is not a first order issue in foreign
exchange rate markets (unlike bond or stock markets) whereas Fratzscher (2009) and Fatum et al. (2010) show that
exchange rate reaction to news depends on economic conditions. Bauwens et al. (2005) examine the intraday volatility
impact of macroeconomic news, but their dataset is limited in scope including a 26 week period in 2001, which makes it
difficult to study time-variance in news effects. Given these mixed results and the limited sample periods used in previous
empirical analyses, we contribute to the literature by testing the time-variance in news effects during a more recent and
extensive period, which includes the global financial crisis when the risk conditions were significantly elevated.
Perhaps most relevant to our study is the analysis by Fratzscher (2009). Similar to our paper, Fratzscher (2009) explores
the behavior of the US dollar during the global financial crisis. However, the focus of Fratzscher (2009) is not the reaction of
exchange rates to macroeconomic announcements per se. Rather, it provides an explanation to the general depreciation
trend in the global currencies vis-à-vis the US dollar during the crisis by concentrating on the cross-sectional determinants
such as countries’ foreign exchange (FX) reserves, current account positions and financial exposure vis-à-vis the United
States. As a side result, the study also reports that there has been an across the board reversal in the direction of the daily
exchange rate reaction to macroeconomic news between July 2008 and January 2009.
In our paper, we take this result a step further and analyze the announcement effects during the entire crisis period using
high-frequency exchange rate returns. Contrary to the findings in Fratzscher (2009), however, we show that only a selective
group of announcements’ coefficients reversed sign during the crisis, primarily news related to housing, credit and labor
markets indicating the context-specific nature of the sign switch effect. The difference in our findings largely stems from
the window over which we calculate the exchange rate returns.
We use intraday returns because intraday data are more appropriate for investigating announcement effects in currency
markets. The advantage of using high frequency exchange rate dataset is that it helps capture the pure announcement effects.
Earlier analyses that rely on daily FX returns may miss the variation in news response coefficients given the rapid response of
exchange rate returns to news. Previous literature shows that the conditional mean adjustments of exchange rates to
macroeconomic news occur quickly, within a few minutes following the news announcement, effectively amounting to
jumps (Andersen et al., 2003, 2007). Therefore, in markets where return reaction to announcements is rapid (as in FX mar-
kets), the use of wider (daily) return windows may contaminate the announcement effects since longer intervals may
include other events as well. This would reduce the public signal to noise ratio and introduce bias in the daily news response
coefficients. To mitigate this bias, many studies in the FX literature use high-frequency data to examine the announcement
effects (e.g. Andersen et al., 2003; Andersen et al., 2007; Bauwens et al., 2005; Faust et al., 2007; Goldberg and Grisse, 2013;
Fatum et al., 2010).
In addition, the analysis in Fratzscher (2009) spans the period between 1994 and January 2009, hence does not cover the
entire crisis period. According to the NBER, the economic contraction that began with the US financial crisis lasted until the
end of June 2009. Therefore, although the sample period in Fratzscher (2009) is longer than ours, it is not enough to inves-
tigate the crisis episode fully as it lacks 6 months of the crisis period. Since our paper’s focus and contribution is the inves-
tigation of the unusual sign reversal in news effects that took place in major currency markets during the US financial crisis,
including the entire crisis episode in the investigation is critical for our analysis.
To explore the possible sources of the change in news coefficient signs over our sample period, we consider various expla-
nations for time-variant news effects suggested by the literature. Specifically, we examine the importance of the changes in
(1) economic conditions, (2) central bank interest rate policies and (3) aggregate risk levels. As noted previously in the lit-
erature, the 2008 global financial crisis is directly related to the US monetary conditions and the fluctuations in risk aversion
and uncertainty (Bekaert et al., 2012; Bruno and Shin, 2013; Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2012). There are different channels
through which risk can affect the behavior of news response coefficients. The first channel involves the fluctuations in the
risk premium associated with holding non-US dollar currency assets (Faust et al., 2007) and investors turning to safe, low-
return US dollar denominated assets in response to the sharp increase in economic uncertainty (McCauley and McGuire,
2009; Gourinchas et al., 2010). Considering the US role as the global insurer in the international monetary system, investors’
flight to quality due to an increase in risk aversion is likely to result in a reversal of the relationship between the macronews
and exchange rates during crisis times, in that bad (good) US growth news signal even worse (better) global growth pro-
spects, which impact other countries’ currencies more negatively (positively) than the US dollar, and hence appreciate
(depreciate) the dollar.
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omy gets closer to or farther away from the central bank targets of inflation and output, the weight investors attach to a
given piece of news might vary due to perceived future changes in monetary policy (Goldberg and Grisse, 2013). Contrary
to this, however, Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2004, 2011) argue that rational investors tend to search for a ‘‘scapegoat” fun-
damental and attach a higher weight to it when their beliefs about the long-run value of the exchange rate conflict with the
short-run movements, and the ‘‘scapegoat” fundamental’s behavior is in line with the short-run exchange rate trend. Hence,
while scapegoat theory implies ad hoc shifts in investor focus, Goldberg and Grisse (2013) emphasize the role of business
cycles and context-specific policy decisions in generating dynamic news effects.
To account for the sources of time variation in news effects, we augment our conditional mean model by including var-
ious measures of risk, interest rates and carry trade returns. Our results suggest that the fluctuation in the aggregate risk
level is a particularly important contributor to the change in the news coefficient signs, specifically for consumption, real-
estate and employment related news items. We find that, as market risk increases, the dollar appreciation in response to
a unit of positive US growth news dampens. We also find that the fluctuations in carry trade returns are significant contrib-
utors to time-varying news effects especially in the dollar-yen market. In addition, our results show that the appreciation of
the dollar in response to a unit of positive US growth news is intensified as long-term interest rates increase, which is con-
sistent with the predictions of the standard exchange rate determination models.
Furthermore, given the more gradual and persistent the volatility reaction to macroeconomic news, we test the time-
variance in news effects by analyzing the conditional variance of exchange rate returns following the news announcements
over our sample period. We find that consistent with the increase in uncertainty, the volatility response to majority of the US
news releases increases during the global financial crisis.
The contributions of our paper are the following: (1) Contrary to the previous studies which rely on daily returns, we
show that only a small subset of news items exhibit coefficient sign asymmetry. (2) The news effects that switch sign are
those that are related to consumption, housing, labor and credit markets, which were at the epicenter of the crisis, indicating
a context-specific shift in investor reaction. (3) Announcement timing matters for the sign switch effect in that sign reversal
is most prevalent for the earliest releases within a month containing incremental information about consumption and real-
estate market risks. (4) The fluctuations in the market risk is the primary contributor to the sign reversal in news effects. (5)
The volatility reaction to news is larger in the crisis period for a majority of the US announcements.
Overall, we find that investor sentiment and economic conditions have an important impact on currency return behavior.
During periods of elevated risk, traditional relationships between macroeconomic fundamentals and exchange rates may not
hold. Investors and financial institutions that hold and trade international assets as well as the managers of non-financial
corporations that participate in FX markets due to the nature and requirements of their businesses (such as importing,
exporting and hedging activities) should take into account the time-variant nature of announcement effects.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the datasets and the econometric methodology. In Section 3,
we present the results documenting the sign switch effect based on the conditional mean return and volatility models. Sec-
tion 4 introduces results from the augmented model, which includes the determinants of the sign switch effect. Section 5
presents the findings regarding the volatility reaction to news and the final section concludes.2. Data and methodology
2.1. Exchange rate and macroeconomic news dataset
Our 5-min intraday exchange rate dataset, provided by Hotspot FXi, consists of euro-dollar, pound-dollar and yen-dollar
currency pairs and spans eight years from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2012. It contains tradable (as opposed to indica-
tive) quotes for the bid and ask spot exchange rates. We compute the midpoint price by taking the average of bid and ask
prices. At the end of each 5-min interval, we use the closest previous tick to select the relevant price. Next, the return (Rt,n) at
time interval n on day t is computed as the difference between the logarithms of the prices at times n  1 and n, multiplied
by 100. We define a trading day to start at 00:00 EST and end at 23:55 EST. We exclude weekends and holidays due to trading
activity. After these filters, the total number of returns in our sample reduces to 514,724 (Table 1).
Our news dataset includes the announced values of the US macroeconomic fundamentals along with the forecasts of the
traders in anticipation of those releases.1 To measure the unexpected component of each announcement, we calculate the stan-
dardized news surprise as the difference between the announced value of the indicator and its median forecast from the MMS
survey divided by the sample standard deviation of this difference. We cover all relevant US announcements that influence the
currency markets following Andersen et al. (2003, 2007) and Fatum et al. (2010). The list includes the three GDP reports
(advance, second and third), non-farm payroll employment, initial jobless claims, industrial production, capacity utilization,
retail sales, personal income, consumer spending, construction spending, new home sales, durable goods orders, factory orders,
business inventories, trade balance, producer price index, consumer price index, consumer confidence index, ISM index, housing
starts, index of leading indicators, treasury budget and target Federal funds rate releases. In line with the literature, we group1 All news data are collected by the Money Market Services (MMS) provided by Action Economics, and Bloomberg.
Table 1
Summary Statistics. This table reports the summary statistics of 5-min exchange rate returns between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2012. The dataset is
provided by HotspotFXi and contains tradeable bid-ask prices. The return at time t (Rt) is computed as the difference between the logarithms of the midpoint
prices at times t-1 and t, multiplied by 100. Trading days start at 00:00 EST and end at 23:55 EST. We also exclude weekends and holidays because of low
trading activity, which reduces the total number of returns in our sample to 514,724.
$/EUR returns $/GBP returns $/JPY returns
Mean 0.00005 0.00005 0.00000
Median 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Maximum 1.121 1.172 1.792
Minimum 1.129 1.211 2.871
Std. Dev. 0.041 0.041 0.043
Skewness 0.106 0.121 0.294
Kurtosis 19.94 24.76 86.43
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ment purchases, prices, central bank policy rate and forward-looking news (Table 2).
To capture the unscheduled news events that occurred over our sample period, we construct an indicator variable that
takes on the value ‘‘1” on the dates when there is an unanticipated market event or a policy action announced by a regulatory
authority. We use the list of events provided by the NY Fed’s Financial Turmoil Timeline as our guide (NY Fed, 2011).2 The
unscheduled news indicator includes releases by the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, foreign central banks, and other regulatory
institutions (e.g. the introduction of the economic stimulus act, the establishment of the swap lines and other capital injections)
as well as unanticipated market events such as the loss reports by Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and General Motors bankrupt-
cies and credit agency downgrades.
Our sample spans the 2005–2012 period which includes the entire crisis episode. Following Melvin and Taylor (2009), we
assume the crisis started in August 2007 when the first signs of the financial market turmoil emerged and end on June 30th,
2009. We also test for the sensitivity of our findings to the changes in the crisis definition and consider alternative start and
end dates including the recession dates determined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 3 and Fratzscher
(2009).
2.2. Econometric methodology
Previous literature shows that the conditional mean adjustments of exchange rates to macroeconomic news occur
rapidly, within a few minutes following the news announcement, effectively amounting to jumps (Andersen et al., 2003,
2007). Based on this stylized fact and the framework suggested in Andersen et al. (2003), we estimate the conditional mean
response of the 5-min returns (Rt,n) to scheduled US macroeconomic announcements, k, as follows:2 For
3 http








bkjSk;t;nj þ et;n ð1Þwhere n ¼ 1; . . . ;N is the intraday interval on day t and Sk;t;n is the surprise component of news k corresponding to interval n
on day t, which is equal to the difference between the announced value of the news indicator (Akt) and its median forecast
from the MMS survey (Fkt) divided by the sample standard deviation of (Akt-Fkt). K denotes the total number of the different
types of scheduled US macroeconomic news indicators in our sample (K = 24). We have a total number of 514,724 observa-
tions and choose I = 4 and J = 2 based on the Schwarz and Akaike information criteria.




















qkjSk;t;nj þ e0t;n: ð2Þwhere we control for the cyclical seasonality pattern using the Flexible Fourier Form (the sum of sine and cosine terms) and
the one-step ahead volatility GARCH (1,1) r̂t . In addition, Il captures the Japanese lunch hour, Japanese open, and the US late
afternoon.
We estimate the mean Eq. (1) using a two-step weighted least-squares (WLS) procedure. First, we estimate the mean
equation by ordinary least-squares method, and then we estimate the volatility Eq. (2), which we use to perform the
weighted least-squares estimation of Eq. (1).4
In contrast to the documented rapid conditional mean adjustment of exchange rates to news, previous studies find that
the conditional variance adjustment to macroeconomic news surprises is more gradual, with complete adjustment occurringa full list of events and policy actions included in our analysis, see the NYFed‘s Financial Turmoil Timeline (2011).
://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html.
Andersen et al. (2003) for more details about the WLS procedure.
Table 2
US macroeconomic announcements. There are 24 different announcements that are grouped into
nine indicator categories: Real activity, employment, consumption, investment, net exports,
government purchases, prices, central bank policy rate and forward-looking news. GDP reports are
released quarterly. The target Fed funds rate is released every six weeks. Initial jobless claims are
announced weekly.
Indicator Group Announcement Source
Real activity GDP advance report Bureau of Economic Analysis
Real activity GDP second report Bureau of Economic Analysis
Real activity GDP third report Bureau of Economic Analysis
Real activity Capacity utilization Federal Reserve Board
Real activity Industrial production Federal Reserve Board
Real activity Personal income Bureau of Economic Analysis
Real activity Retail sales Bureau of the Census
Consumption New home sales Bureau of the Census
Consumption Personal expenditure Bureau of Economic Analysis
Investment Business inventories Bureau of the Census
Investment Construction spending Bureau of the Census
Investment Durable orders Bureau of the Census
Investment Factory orders Bureau of the Census
Price Consumer Price Index Bureau of Labor Statistics
Price Producer Price Index Bureau of Labor Statistics
Forward-looking Consumer confidence Conference Board
Forward-looking Housing starts Bureau of the Census
Forward-looking ISM (Manufacturing) Institute for Supply Management
Forward-looking Leading indicators Conference Board
Employment Initial claims Employment and Training Administration
Employment Nonfarm payrolls Bureau of Labor Statistics
FOMC Fed funds rate Federal Reserve Board
Net exports Trade balance Bureau of Economic Analysis
Government Treasury budget Financial Management Service
100 W. Ben Omrane, T. Savaser / J. Int. Financ. Markets Inst. Money 45 (2016) 96–114within two hours after the news release (Andersen et al., 2003; Bauwens et al., 2005; Dominguez and Panthaki, 2006). To
control for such a persistence, we impose a polynomial structure on the response pattern associated with the news coeffi-
cient, qkj, where J denotes the response window (j ¼ 1;2; . . . ; J). The polynomial specification ensures that the response pat-
terns are fully incorporated within the response horizon, J:5 Cen
averagekj ¼ s1 1 jJ
 3 !
þ s2 1 jJ
 2 !
jþ s3 1 jJ
  
j2: ð3ÞHere, kj represents the fitted values corresponding to the centered average absolute returns regression on the polynomial
exogenous variables.5
To analyze the conditional mean adjustment of exchange rates to news during the crisis period, we construct an indicator
variable (Dcrisis), which takes on the value ‘‘1” for the observations between during the crisis and ‘‘0” else. To denote intervals
outside the crisis period, we define (Dno-crisis) as (1  Dcrisis). Then, we interact the news surprise variables with the indicator













ckjSk;t;njDcrisis þXUNSCt;n þ tt;n: ð4ÞWe also include an unscheduled news indicator variable (UNSCt) in Eq. (4), which takes on the value ‘‘1” whenever there
is an unanticipated market event or a policy action announcement by a regulatory authority such as the Fed, SEC or the ECB.
The New York Fed Financial Turmoil Timeline details the list of events included in our analysis (Federal Reserve Bank, 2011).
In parallel with the conditional mean model, in order to investigate the presence of time-variant exchange rate volatility
reaction to news over our sample period, we interact the news surprise variables in the volatility model with the crisis indi-


























q00kjSk;t;njDcrisis þ t0t;n ð5Þtered average absolute returns are computed as the average absolute returns at each time interval just after the news announcements minus the
absolute return computed over the whole sample.
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(1) by including interactions of the surprise variables with three factors that the previous literature identifies as potential
contributors to time-variant news effects in currency markets. These factors include (i) the aggregate risk level in the econ-
























cLTR;kjSk;t;njLTRt;n þXUNSCt;n þ jt;n ð6ÞOur measure of risk is the implied volatility of the S&P 500 index options, which is a standard measure used in the lit-
erature (Bekaert et al., 2012; Goldberg and Grisse, 2013; De Bock and De Carvalho, 2013). The index is quoted in annualized
percentage point terms and represents the market’s expectation of the stock market volatility over the next 30-day period.
Next, we consider the effect of the Federal Reserve Bank’s interest rate policies. In particular, when the Fed lowered the short
term interest rates to zero in order to combat the recessionary effects of the financial crisis, markets began to pay less atten-
tion to short-term yields, rendering the long-term rates the effective tool for monetary policy (Swanson and Williams, 2013,
2014). For this reason, we use the 10-year real treasury yields as the relevant measure of interest rate policy. To capture the
effect of the changes in the profitability and the direction of the carry trade flows, we include the 5-min Australian dollar-
Japanese yen exchange rates in our augmented model. This is a popular currency pair among the G-10 carry trade investors
due to its liquidity (De Bock and De Carvalho, 2013). In order to assess the relative contribution of each factor and enable
direct comparison between the coefficient estimates, we center and standardize the values of (VIXt), (LTRt) and (AUDt).
For instance, when VIXt is equal to zero, the volatility index is at its sample average. Table 3 presents the summary statistics
of these variables.3. Intraday analysis of the sign switch effect: composition and characteristics
Standard models of exchange rate determination predict that positive (negative) US growth news tend to appreciate
(depreciate) the dollar. Earlier empirical intraday studies support these predictions and show that stronger than expected
economic activity news tends to appreciate a country’s currency.6 Our full sample analysis, which focuses on the 5-min con-
ditional mean adjustment of currency returns over the 2005–2012 period confirms this finding (Eq. (1)). For instance, a one
standard deviation positive (negative) US non-farm payroll employment surprise appreciates (depreciates) the dollar against
the yen by 20.9 basis points (Table 4). This is an economically and statistically significant effect given the conventional
dollar-yen interdealer spreads, which average around 1.5 basis points over our sample period (Mancini et al., 2013).
Yet, the relevance of macro news for currency markets can vary over time (Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2004, 2011;
Cheung and Chinn, 2001; Rossi, 2006; Sarno and Valente, 2009). In particular, business cycles, sharp fluctuations in risk con-
ditions and central bank policies can generate time-variant news effects in currency markets. For instance, Fatum et al.
(2010) document substantial asymmetry over the business cycle in the dollar-yen market between 1999 and 2006. Contrary
to these results, however, Faust et al. (2007) and Andersen et al. (2007) indicate relatively stable exchange rate reaction to
news across different states of the economy.
Given the mixed results in the literature, we investigate the stability of the relationship between macro news and
exchange rates using a more recent and comprehensive news dataset. Our data comprise all major scheduled and unsched-
uled US macroeconomic news between 2005 and 2012, an interval which includes the financial market turmoil as well as the
expansionary periods that precede and follow it. Following Melvin and Taylor (2009), we date the crisis in the currency mar-
kets as the interval between August 2007 and July 2009 and estimate separate news effect coefficients for the crisis and the
no-crisis periods (Eq. (2)). We later test the sensitivity of our results to the changes in the crisis definition.
Our findings confirm the time-varying nature of the exchange-rate reaction to news. Specifically, we show that the sign as
well as the magnitude of the news effect coefficients varies over time. Over our sample period, a positive one standard devi-
ation surprise in new home sales leads to an appreciation of the dollar against the euro by 4.5 basis points in expansionary
times while the same surprise leads to a depreciation of the dollar by 6.9 basis points in the crisis period (Table 5). Consumer
confidence figures are similar in that, in response to a shock of equal magnitude, the dollar appreciates against the yen by 4.9
basis points in expansionary periods and depreciates by 4.5 basis points during the crisis. These differences are statistically
significant at the five percent level. Considering the interdealer spreads in the euro-dollar and dollar-yen markets, which
average around one basis point over our sample period, the estimated coefficients represent statistically and economically
meaningful variations in news impact (Mancini et al., 2013).
Our analysis shows that for each currency pair, only a small subset of the macro indicators’ effects reversed sign during
the financial turmoil, in particular announcements relating to housing, credit and labor markets, which were at the epicenter
of the crisis. In both the pound-dollar and the euro-dollar markets, about seven out of the 24 different macroeconomican extensive literature survey on the documented announcement effects in currency markets, see Neely and Dey (2010).
Table 3
Summary statistics: Augmented model variables. This table reports the summary statistics of the implied volatility of the S&P 500 index options (VIX), the 10-
year real treasury rate (LTR) and the 5-min Australian dollar-Japanese yen exchange rates (AUD) used in the augmented model. The data span the period
between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2012. Chicago Board Options Exchange provides the volatility index (VIX), which is quoted in annualized
percentage point terms and represents the market’s expectation of the stock market volatility over the next 30-day period. The 10-year real treasury rates (LTR)
are from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The 5-min Australian dollar-Japanese yen exchange rates (AUD) are quoted per Australian dollar
and computed using the dataset provided by HotspotFXi. We center and standardize the variables around their respective sample means and use the
standardized versions in the estimation of Eq. (3).
VIX LTR AUD VIX centered LTR centered AUD centered
Mean 21.46 4.04 84.61 0.00 0.00 0.00
Median 18.53 4.25 83.74 0.28 0.25 0.10
Maximum 80.86 5.41 107.83 5.61 1.63 2.53
Minimum 9.89 2.06 55.34 1.09 2.37 3.19
Std. Dev. 10.59 0.84 9.17 1.00 1.00 1.00
Skewness 2.02 0.70 0.16 2.02 0.70 0.16
Kurtosis 8.26 2.48 3.80 8.26 2.48 3.80
Table 4
Contemporaneous US news response coefficients. This table reports the contemporaneous US news response coefficients from the mean model based on Eq. (1).
For each currency pair, the first column presents the news response coefficient estimates from the whole sample (bk) and the second column provides the p-
values of the individual coefficients.
USD/EUR USD/GBP JPY/USD
News variables bk p-val bk p-val bk p-val
Capacity utilization 0.005 0.540 0.031 0.001 0.010 0.248
GDP advanced report 0.042 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.026 0.000
GDP second report 0.035 0.000 0.025 0.014 0.061 0.000
GDP third report 0.023 0.007 0.021 0.005 0.062 0.000
Industrial production 0.004 0.597 0.027 0.004 0.013 0.121
Personal income 0.005 0.334 0.010 0.030 0.000 0.967
Retail sales 0.010 0.006 0.023 0.000 0.094 0.000
New home sales 0.042 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.072 0.000
Personal expenditure 0.014 0.001 0.011 0.017 0.008 0.099
Business inventories 0.010 0.011 0.016 0.000 0.002 0.704
Construction spending 0.017 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.020 0.000
Durable orders 0.024 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.037 0.000
Factory orders 0.022 0.000 0.012 0.004 0.032 0.000
CPI 0.013 0.002 0.024 0.000 0.012 0.008
PPI 0.020 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.032 0.000
Consumer confidence 0.019 0.000 0.010 0.011 0.002 0.653
Housing starts 0.004 0.419 0.000 0.959 0.030 0.000
ISM 0.025 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.092 0.000
Leading indicators 0.001 0.791 0.021 0.000 0.025 0.000
Initial claims 0.006 0.001 0.008 0.000 0.031 0.000
Nonfarm payrolls 0.048 0.000 0.069 0.000 0.209 0.000
Fed funds rate 0.033 0.000 0.062 0.000 0.014 0.004
Trade balance 0.054 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.061 0.000
Treasury budget 0.007 0.169 0.000 0.991 0.007 0.120
102 W. Ben Omrane, T. Savaser / J. Int. Financ. Markets Inst. Money 45 (2016) 96–114releases switched sign (Table 5). In the yen-dollar market, fewer announcements’ effect (3 out of 24) reversed sign, possibly
due to yen’s own safe-haven currency status in the international monetary system.
We also investigate the timing of the reversal in the exchange rate reaction to news by focusing on the CPI, consumer
confidence and new home sales announcements, which portray the strong sign asymmetry over our sample period. We plot
the surprise component of these news releases along with the intraday returns of the three major currency pairs (Figs. 1, 2
and 3) and find that the reversal of the relationship between news surprise and exchange rate returns starts at the beginning
of 2008. Therefore, we redefine our currency dummy and date the crisis period as the interval between January 2008 and July
2009, which also overlaps with the US recession as indicated by the NBER. We rerun Eq. (4) based on the new crisis definition
and find that our earlier results remain unchanged. As before, the sign switch effect occurs specifically in crisis-related news
coefficients. It is evident in consumer price index (CPI), consumer confidence and federal funds rate releases. There is further
evidence of sign changes in new home sales, retail sales, housing starts, initial claims and nonfarm payroll announcements
for these currency markets (Table 6).
Among the specific announcement effects, the market reaction to employment reports (i.e. nonfarm payroll and initial
claims) is striking. We find that positive employment news appreciates the dollar against the euro and pound in expansion,
but depreciates it in recession (Table 6). Boyd et al. (2005) and Andersen et al. (2007) also find a similar sign switch in
response to employment news in stock markets. Based on the standard asset-pricing model, they attribute this effect to
Table 5
The changing effect of macroeconomic news during the financial crisis (August 1, 2007 and June 30, 2009). This table reports the contemporaneous US news
surprise coefficients from the mean model in Eq. (4). For each currency pair, we run a pooled regression. The first column presents the coefficient of the news
surprise variable interacted with the crisis indicator and the third column reports the coefficient of the news surprise variable interacted with the no-crisis
dummy. The second and fourth columns provide the p-values of the respective coefficient estimates. The highlighted rows represent the coefficient equality
tests that are statistically significant at the five percent level. The crisis period spans the interval between August 1, 2007 and June 30, 2009 (as in Melvin and
Taylor, 2009). The last row represents the coefficient estimates for the unscheduled news indicator.
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prominent during contractions, discount rate effects dominate during expansions. This implies, in response to negative
growth news, stock prices decrease during contractions and increase during expansions since negative growth news in
expansions raise the likelihood of the central bank to lower interest rates to stimulate the economy. Although the news coef-
ficient sign reversal we document in exchange rates is similar to the one illustrated by Boyd et al. (2005) and Andersen et al.
(2007) in equity markets, the underlying models that generate this asymmetry are distinct given the differences in the nat-
ure of these two asset classes.
Most importantly, we find that the news coefficient sign reversal is most evident in reaction to retail sales, consumer con-
fidence, consumer price index (CPI), new home sales, housing starts, non-farm payrolls and initial claims reports, which are
the earliest releases within a month containing information about consumption, real-estate and labor markets (Table 6).
Typically, the incremental information value of later releases within an indicator category is smaller compared to news
releases that are announced earlier in a given month since later releases tend to contain data that have already been revealed
to the public in the earlier releases of the related macro indicators (Cheung and Chinn, 2001; Andersen et al., 2003). For
instance, among the 24 announcements that we study here, there are five announcements that contain information about
real economic activity: GDP releases, capacity utilization, industrial production, personal income and retail sales. Within
the real activity indicator category, retail sales is released the earliest in a given month and portrays strong sign asymmetry
in euro and pound markets (Table 7). Similarly, consumer confidence is the first forward-looking variable released within a
given month that portrays news effect sign asymmetry. Housing starts is another forward-looking variable and although it is
not the earliest release within a month, due to the incremental information it contains about the state of the housing sector,
it portrays significant sign asymmetry over our sample period.
Overall, our findings indicate the context-specific nature of the change in investors’ reaction to news and reveal that
announcement chronology within an indicator category matters for the sign switch effect to take place. The documented sign
reversal in news reaction is context-specific because, in a given month, those announcements that are the earliest releases
within an indicator category, which contain incremental information about consumption, real-estate and labor markets
reveal sign asymmetry. Considering the significance of these markets in the evolution of the 2008–2009 financial crisis,
investors rationally paid more attention to the signals in the earliest, most informative releases related to consumption,
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Fig. 1. US consumer price index. This figure plots the evolution of the surprise component of the CPI news releases along with the intraday returns of the
three major currency pairs.
104 W. Ben Omrane, T. Savaser / J. Int. Financ. Markets Inst. Money 45 (2016) 96–114To our knowledge, we provide the first intraday evidence and analysis of the sign switch effect in the foreign exchange
literature. The sign asymmetry we document is similar to that of Fratzscher (2009), which explores the cross-sectional deter-
minants of the sharp depreciation of 54 currencies vis-à-vis the US dollar during the global financial crisis. Yet, based on daily
return data, Fratzscher (2009) finds that almost of all of the important US news coefficients switched sign between July 2008
and January 2009. Contrary to these results, however, we show that only a selective few, crisis-related announcements’ coef-
ficients reversed sign during the financial turmoil. The difference in our findings largely stems from the window over which
we calculate the exchange rate returns.
We believe that the intraday setting is particularly well-suited to examine the unusual behavior of exchange rates during
this period because high-frequency data allow us to capture the direct link between currency movements and macro news
where the 5-min window is tight enough to disentangle announcement-specific effects from other confounding factors such
as unscheduled news releases by the Treasury, central banks and other regulatory institutions as well as unanticipated mar-
ket events (e.g. capital injections by the Treasury, Lehman bankruptcy), which we incorporate in our analysis.
As a robustness check, we also redefine our crisis period to match the crisis interval (July 2008–January 2009) in
Fratzscher (2009). Analyzing the same interval using intraday data, we find that there are even fewer sign switches in the
three major currency markets during this period (Table 8). Our result contradicts the finding based on daily return analysis
(in Fratzscher, 2009), which suggests that almost all major news coefficients reversed sign between July 2008 and January
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Fig. 2. US consumer confidence. This figure 2 plots the evolution of the surprise component of the US consumer confidence news releases along with the
intraday returns of the three major currency pairs.
W. Ben Omrane, T. Savaser / J. Int. Financ. Markets Inst. Money 45 (2016) 96–114 105terms of monthly announcements per indicator is very limited. As our analysis clearly shows the sign switch effect has
started earlier, i.e. in January 2008 and continued well into mid-2009.
Additionally, we test the persistence of our results over time and investigate whether the sign switch effect we document
is reversed in later periods on a given announcement day. Reassuringly, the estimated coefficients of the lagged news sur-
prise variables in Eq. (4) are insignificant, which suggests that the sign switch effect is not reversed in subsequent intervals
(Table 9).7
4. Determinants of the sign switch effect
To explore possible causes of the change in news coefficient signs between 2005 and 2012, we consider two explanations
suggested by the literature: (1) The safe-haven effect generated by an increase in the aggregate risk level, (2) the Fed’s zero
interest rate policy. There are several ways in which risk can affect the exchange-rate reaction to news. The first one involves
the fluctuations in the risk premium associated with holding non-US dollar currency assets (Faust et al., 2007) and investors
turning to safe, low-return US dollar denominated assets in response to the sharp increase in economic uncertainty
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Fig. 3. US new home sales. This figure 3 plots the evolution of the surprise component of the US new home sales releases along with the intraday returns of
the three major currency pairs.
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nal even worse (better) global growth prospects, which impact other countries’ currencies more negatively (positively) than
the US dollar, and hence appreciate (depreciate) the dollar. Related to the changes in the risk premium, De Bock and De
Carvalho, 2013 also highlight the role of unwinding of carry trade positions and show that exchange rates that are more sen-
sitive to carry trade flows before the crisis tend to depreciate more against the US dollar during the financial crisis. As an
alternative channel, Goldberg and Grisse (2013) point out that sharp fluctuations in risk conditions can shift the central bank
priorities leading to a change in the investors’ perception of future monetary policy, which can ultimately alter the reaction
of bond and currency markets to macroeconomic news. Additionally, monetary policy can work through the risk-taking
channel and these policy shocks themselves can have a significant impact on risk aversion (Bekaert et al., 2012; Bruno
and Shin, 2013).
Through interest parity condition and Taylor-rule type monetary policy reaction functions, actual changes in central
bank’s interest rate policies as well as investors’ updated expectations regarding future interest rate paths can influence
how exchange rates react to macronews (Gürkaynak et al., 2005; Swanson and Williams, 2013, 2014; Goldberg and
Grisse, 2013). For instance, as interest rates get closer to the zero bound, monetary policy could presumably become less
effective. In such an environment, most of the adjustment would be reflected in future long-term interest rates and prices.
Indeed when the Fed lowered the short term interest rates to zero in order to combat the recessionary effects of the financial
crisis, markets began to pay less attention to short-term yields, rendering the long-term rates the effective tool for monetary
Table 6
The changing effect of macroeconomic news: Alternative crisis definition (NBER recession dates: January 1, 2008 and June 30, 2009). This table reports the
contemporaneous US news response coefficients from Eq. (4). For each currency pair, we run a pooled regression. The first (third) column presents the news
surprise coefficients interacted with the crisis dummy (no-crisis dummy). The highlighted rows represent the coefficient equality tests that are statistically
significant at the five percent level. Following the NBER, we define the crisis period as the interval between January 1, 2008 and June 30, 2009.
W. Ben Omrane, T. Savaser / J. Int. Financ. Markets Inst. Money 45 (2016) 96–114 107policy (Swanson and Williams, 2013, 2014). In such a setting, investors’ interpretation of what a given macroeconomic
announcement implies for future monetary policy could be different than when the short term interest rates are not con-
strained by the zero bound and through interest parity condition, this could affect the sensitivity of exchange rates to
macroeconomic announcements.
To account for these possibilities, we augment the conditional mean model by interacting our measures of risk, carry
trade returns and interest rates with the news surprise variable (Eq. (6)). As explained in the data section, we use the implied
volatility of the S&P 500 index options, (VIXt), as a proxy for risk, which is the standard risk measure in the literature
(Goldberg and Grisse, 2013; De Bock and De Carvalho, 2013). To capture the effect of the Fed’s interest rate policies over
our sample period, we use the 10-year real treasury yields (LTRt) as the relevant measure of monetary policy. We include
the 5-min Australian dollar-Japanese yen exchange rates (AUDt) in our augmented model to measure the effect of the
changes in the profitability and the direction of the carry trade flows given the popularity of this currency pair among
the G-10 carry trade investors (De Bock and De Carvalho, 2013).
Augmented model results suggest that the average reaction of the US dollar to US macroeconomic news is in line with the
predictions of the standard models of exchange rate determination. That is, when the values of VIXt, AUDt and LTRt are at
their respective sample averages,8 the US dollar appreciates (depreciates) vis-à-vis the three major currency pairs in response
to a given positive (negative) US news surprise (Tables 10A, 10B, 10C). As an example, consider the non-farm payroll announce-
ment. During normal times when VIXt, AUDt and LTRt are at their sample means, a one standard deviation positive US payroll
employment surprise, as expected, appreciates the dollar by about 8 basis points against the euro. However, a one standard
deviation increase in risk, VIXt, dampens the appreciation of the dollar in response to a positive surprise by 5 basis points
(Table 10A). Similarly, the coefficient signs of new home sales, retail sales, construction spending, housing starts and initial
claims announcements are also sensitive to fluctuations in the risk level. About half of the announcements whose coefficients
switch sign in the euro-dollar and pound-dollar markets in Tables 5 and 6 have positive news surprise interaction coefficients
with the VIX variable in Tables 10A and 10B. Overall, our results suggest that the appreciation of the dollar in response to good
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Table 8
The changing effect of macroeconomic news: Alternative crisis definition in Fratzscher (2009) (July 1, 2008 and January 31, 2009). This table reports the
contemporaneous US news response coefficients from the mean model in Eq. (4). For each currency pair, we run a pooled regression. The first (third) column
presents the news surprise coefficients interacted with the crisis dummy (no-crisis dummy). The crisis episode is defined to match that of Fratzscher (2009) and
spans the interval July 1, 2008 - January 31, 2009. The highlighted rows represent statistically significant coefficient equality tests at the five percent level.
able 9
ersistence of the sign switch effect: 10-min US news response coefficients from the mean model. This table reports the 10-min (2nd lag of) US news response
efficients estimates in Eq. (4). For each currency pair, we run a pooled regression where the first (third) column presents the news surprise coefficients
teracted with the crisis dummy (no-crisis dummy). The crisis is defined as the interval between August 1, 2007 and June 30, 2009.





Contemporaneous US news response coefficients from the augmented model: USD/EUR. This table reports the contemporaneous US news response coefficients
from the augmented model in Eq. (6), which includes interactions of the implied volatility of the S&P 500 index options (VIX), the 10-year treasury rates (LTR)
and the 5-min Australian dollar-Japanese yen exchange rate (AUD) with the news surprise variables. We center and standardize the three variables around their
respective sample means and use the standardized versions in the estimation of Eq. (3).
News variables Surprise p-val Surprise  VIX p-val Surprise  AUD p-val Surprise  LTR p-val
Capacity utilization 0.004 0.671 0.003 0.837 0.001 0.922 0.006 0.520
GDP advanced report 0.213 0.000 0.121 0.000 0.021 0.453 0.204 0.000
GDP second report 0.045 0.000 0.043 0.021 0.045 0.005 0.024 0.016
GDP third report 0.029 0.003 0.041 0.001 0.028 0.094 0.014 0.278
Industrial production 0.009 0.253 0.003 0.839 0.026 0.085 0.005 0.563
Personal income 0.012 0.074 0.007 0.331 0.009 0.102 0.021 0.051
Retail sales 0.038 0.000 0.026 0.000 0.002 0.718 0.024 0.000
New home sales 0.000 0.982 0.031 0.001 0.002 0.796 0.037 0.001
Personal expenditure 0.013 0.003 0.005 0.443 0.007 0.208 0.007 0.201
Business inventories 0.003 0.531 0.014 0.014 0.002 0.724 0.016 0.008
Construction spending 0.025 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.046 0.000 0.007 0.156
Durable orders 0.023 0.000 0.003 0.609 0.001 0.923 0.021 0.000
Factory orders 0.022 0.000 0.006 0.182 0.007 0.216 0.002 0.725
Consumer price index 0.006 0.181 0.003 0.505 0.000 0.976 0.010 0.125
Producer price index 0.012 0.024 0.003 0.549 0.005 0.381 0.020 0.004
Consumer confidence 0.011 0.011 0.009 0.015 0.028 0.000 0.009 0.051
Housing starts 0.002 0.780 0.012 0.104 0.006 0.504 0.008 0.328
ISM 0.023 0.000 0.010 0.015 0.001 0.826 0.015 0.012
Leading indicators 0.006 0.143 0.006 0.211 0.020 0.000 0.006 0.205
Initial claims 0.003 0.198 0.005 0.019 0.011 0.000 0.021 0.000
Nonfarm payrolls 0.076 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.011 0.022
Fed funds rate 0.057 0.000 0.083 0.000 0.015 0.008 0.181 0.000
Trade balance -0.063 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.068 0.000
Treasury budget 0.001 0.870 0.003 0.639 0.009 0.323 0.008 0.348
O total p-val
Unscheduled News 0.000 0.310
Table 10B
Contemporaneous US news response coefficients from the augmented model: USD/GBP. This table reports the contemporaneous US news response coefficients
from the augmented model in Eq. (6), which includes interactions of the implied volatility of the S&P 500 index options (VIX), the 10-year treasury rates (LTR)
and the 5-min Australian dollar-Japanese yen exchange rate (AUD) with the news surprise variables. We center and standardize the three variables around their
respective sample means and use the standardized versions in the estimation of Eq. (3).
News variables Surprise p-val Surprise  VIX p-val Surprise  AUD p-val Surprise  LTR p-val
Capacity utilization 0.014 0.128 0.011 0.496 0.016 0.326 0.001 0.956
GDP advanced report 0.184 0.000 0.145 0.000 0.058 0.078 0.196 0.000
GDP second report 0.025 0.013 0.022 0.276 0.031 0.079 0.018 0.126
GDP third report 0.004 0.664 0.006 0.684 0.013 0.466 0.005 0.737
Industrial production 0.022 0.016 0.008 0.568 0.005 0.767 0.012 0.191
Personal income 0.004 0.575 0.015 0.062 0.008 0.237 0.005 0.668
Retail sales 0.030 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.004 0.569 0.012 0.092
New home sales 0.010 0.211 0.012 0.261 0.006 0.434 0.052 0.000
Personal expenditure 0.011 0.022 0.008 0.241 0.005 0.442 0.009 0.131
Business inventories 0.003 0.602 0.017 0.006 0.001 0.829 0.011 0.124
Construction spending 0.013 0.005 0.041 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.000 0.957
Durable orders 0.014 0.008 0.005 0.361 0.001 0.918 0.020 0.002
Factory orders 0.022 0.000 0.012 0.014 0.003 0.607 0.008 0.173
Consumer price index 0.006 0.301 0.020 0.000 0.015 0.011 0.013 0.090
Producer price index 0.003 0.617 0.021 0.000 0.005 0.409 0.037 0.000
Consumer confidence 0.011 0.026 0.014 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.012 0.025
Housing starts 0.000 0.953 0.011 0.176 0.005 0.565 0.005 0.623
ISM 0.016 0.000 0.012 0.006 0.001 0.857 0.004 0.623
Leading indicators 0.003 0.497 0.008 0.167 0.007 0.270 0.004 0.438
Initial claims 0.003 0.152 0.011 0.000 0.006 0.040 0.020 0.000
Nonfarm payrolls 0.066 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.030 0.000
Fed funds rate 0.057 0.000 0.071 0.000 0.011 0.093 0.174 0.000
Trade balance 0.051 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.051 0.000
Treasury budget 0.002 0.847 0.002 0.790 0.003 0.805 0.008 0.449
O total p-val
Unscheduled News 0.000 0.437
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Table 10C
Contemporaneous US news response coefficients from the augmented model: USD/JPY. This table reports the contemporaneous US news response coefficients
from the augmented model in Eq. (6), which includes interactions of the implied volatility of the S&P 500 index options (VIX), the 10-year treasury rates (LTR)
and the 5-min Australian dollar-Japanese yen exchange rate (AUD) with the news surprise variables. We center and standardize the three variables around their
respective sample means and use the standardized versions in the estimation of Eq. (3).
News variables Surprise p-val Surprise  VIX p-val Surprise  AUD p-val Surprise  LTR p-val
Capacity utilization 0.013 0.154 0.009 0.570 0.019 0.224 0.009 0.378
GDP advanced report 0.286 0.000 0.112 0.001 0.066 0.030 0.000 0.996
GDP second report 0.050 0.000 0.045 0.016 0.047 0.004 0.011 0.347
GDP third report 0.065 0.000 0.021 0.100 0.042 0.014 0.004 0.760
Industrial production 0.019 0.028 0.008 0.552 0.029 0.053 0.000 0.957
Personal income 0.005 0.537 0.022 0.003 0.003 0.639 0.003 0.794
Retail sales 0.105 0.000 0.008 0.145 0.004 0.454 0.004 0.612
New home sales 0.056 0.000 0.028 0.003 0.030 0.000 0.023 0.070
Personal expenditure 0.009 0.061 0.013 0.061 0.010 0.140 0.011 0.082
Business inventories 0.006 0.231 0.018 0.002 0.001 0.790 0.005 0.473
Construction spending 0.009 0.043 0.006 0.397 0.026 0.001 0.031 0.000
Durable orders 0.044 0.000 0.003 0.553 0.033 0.000 0.007 0.261
Factory orders 0.037 0.000 0.012 0.012 0.027 0.000 0.013 0.033
Consumer price index 0.018 0.001 0.021 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.004 0.610
Producer price index 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.927 0.013 0.016 0.018 0.021
Consumer confidence 0.039 0.000 0.052 0.000 0.040 0.000 0.003 0.498
Housing starts 0.037 0.000 0.052 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.046 0.000
ISM 0.117 0.000 0.026 0.000 0.019 0.004 0.053 0.000
Leading indicators 0.021 0.000 0.016 0.003 0.032 0.000 0.011 0.048
Initial claims 0.038 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.001 0.569 0.004 0.176
Nonfarm payrolls 0.274 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.108 0.000 0.048 0.000
Fed funds rate 0.027 0.001 0.016 0.009 0.021 0.000 0.083 0.000
Trade balance 0.059 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.064 0.000 0.053 0.000
Treasury budget 0.005 0.555 0.008 0.268 0.006 0.531 0.003 0.743
O total p-val
Unscheduled News 0.001 0.837
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particular, the US dollar appreciation in response to positive US growth in construction spending, housing starts, CPI and the
target federal funds rate announcements dampens as the Australian dollar appreciates against the yen. Considering the Aus-
tralian dollar depreciation against the yen as an indication of carry trade reversals, the latter finding implies that the dollar
appreciation in response to positive growth news in these announcements is muted when carry trade is more profitable
(Table 10C).
Regarding the Fed’s monetary policy, we find that the long-term interest rates are an important contributor to the time-
varying news effects in almost all announcement categories. In line with the standard models of exchange rate determina-
tion, our results show that increases in the 10-year real interest rates amplify the US dollar’s appreciation vis-à-vis the three
major currencies in response to positive US growth news surprises. Our finding indicates that an increase in long-term rates
reinforce the positive effect of growth news on the US dollar, implying that although long-term rates exert a very strong
influence on the news coefficients in the expected direction, they do not contribute to the change in the news coefficient
sign. This result supports Swanson and Williams (2014), which suggest that the euro-dollar and pound-dollar reaction to
macro news have largely been unaffected by the Fed’s unconventional policies and the exchange rates’ reaction to macroe-
conomic news did not change due to the zero lower bound.
Overall, our findings indicate that the sign switch effect we document over the 2005–2012 period is primarily driven by
the changes in the market risk and carry trade returns. We confirm the flight-to-quality hypothesis documented in the lit-
erature (McCauley and McGuire, 2009; McGuire and von Peter, 2009; De Bock and De Carvalho, 2013; Goldberg and Grisse,
2013) and the analysis in Gourinchas et al. (2010), which suggests that, as the center of the international monetary system,
the US acts like a global insurer. This means that during times of global distress, it has an ‘‘exorbitant duty” to make pay-
ments to the rest of the world (similar to insurance claims), which amounted to 19 percent of its GDP over the 2007–
2009 period (Gourinchas et al., 2010). The risk-driven sign switch effect we document lends support to this analysis, in that,
in times of global distress, investors everywhere become risk averse and demand safe US-dollar assets. When there are bad
news emanating from the US, investors in the US and the rest of the world become more risk averse and increase their
demand for safe assets, which appreciates the dollar. When there are good news emanating from the US, investors expec-
tation about global growth prospects improve, which leads them to reduce their demand for US-dollar denominated assets
and depreciates the dollar. Consequently, in times of global distress, the insurance claims paid by the US to the rest of the
world decreases or increases according to the quality of US news, good or bad respectively.
Finally, our analysis does not fit well with the predictions of the scapegoat theory, which argues that the structural insta-
bility of macro parameters could lead rational investors to search for a ‘‘scapegoat” fundamental when their beliefs about the
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theory suggests that the news about a particular macro variable can be picked as a scapegoat if the announced value is incon-
sistent with its long-run equilibrium, but in line with the observed direction of the exchange-rate movement. Hence, while
our findings highlight the context-specific nature of the change in investors’ reaction to news, scapegoat theory emphasizes
the role of ad hoc shifts in investor focus.5. Exchange-rate volatility reaction to news
In this section, we analyze the volatility response of exchange rates to macroeconomic news during our sample period.
Previous literature finds that while the conditional mean return adjustment of exchange rates to news is very rapid, taking
place within a few minutes, exchange rate return volatility adjusts to news only gradually, completing its full response in
about an hour after the announcement (Andersen et al., 2003). Based on this result, we examine whether the sign switch
effect we document in conditional mean returns has implications for the behavior of the second moments in a systematic
manner.
To carry out the analysis, we perform a two-step weighted least square estimation procedure as described in Section 2,
which includes the interactions of the news variables with the crisis and no-crisis dummy variables (Eq. (5)). Since volatility
response is gradual, we report both the contemporaneous and the cumulative volatility response coefficients, which span a
two-hour window following the announcements’ release (Tables 11 and 12).
Overall, our results suggest that most announcements’ volatility impact increased during the crisis. For instance, while a
one standard deviation surprise increase in the Federal funds rate announcement increases euro return volatility by 62 basis
points in expansionary periods, the same magnitude increase translates into an 89 basis point increase in volatility during
the crisis period, an economically and statistically significant difference at the one percent level (Table 12). Volatility reaction
to new home sales and housing starts is also stronger during the crisis. These findings suggest that the substantial increase in
global uncertainty translated into a stronger and persistent volatility reaction to many macroeconomic news during the cri-
sis period. Yet, there are a few exceptions to this result. For instance, we find that the payroll announcements and the jobless
claims reports’ impact on return volatility is stronger in good times than in bad times, a result evident in both the contem-
poraneous and the cumulative news response coefficients for all three major currency pairs.Table 11
Volatility Model: US Contemporaneous News Response Coefficients (NBER recession dates: January 1, 2008 and June 30, 2009). This table presents the
contemporaneous US news response coefficients from the variance model (Eq. (5)). For each currency pair, we run a pooled regression. The first (third) column
presents the news surprise coefficients interacted with the crisis dummy (no-crisis dummy). Following the NBER, we define the crisis period as the interval
between January 1, 2008 and June 30, 2009.
USD/EUR USD/GBP USD/JPY
News variables No-crisis p-val Crisis p-val No-crisis p-val Crisis p-val No-crisis p-val Crisis p-val
Capacity utilization 0.000 0.974 0.008 0.060 0.003 0.029 0.002 0.737 0.001 0.392 0.010 0.029
GDP advanced report 0.035 0.000 0.001 0.703 0.030 0.000 0.011 0.007 0.033 0.000 0.010 0.016
GDP second report 0.009 0.001 0.007 0.045 0.010 0.003 0.013 0.004 0.011 0.001 0.018 0.000
GDP third report 0.003 0.117 0.004 0.263 0.000 0.953 0.002 0.679 0.012 0.017 0.022 0.026
Industrial production 0.000 0.787 0.003 0.437 0.003 0.011 0.000 0.963 0.002 0.149 0.014 0.001
Personal income 0.004 0.014 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.682 0.006 0.000 0.003 0.116 0.001 0.586
Retail sales 0.015 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.008 0.002 0.019 0.000 0.019 0.000
New home sales 0.005 0.000 0.010 0.083 0.003 0.029 0.004 0.548 0.010 0.000 0.020 0.012
Personal expenditure 0.000 0.853 0.013 0.002 0.001 0.232 0.015 0.001 0.000 0.897 0.012 0.017
Business inventories 0.002 0.085 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.281 0.002 0.217 0.001 0.446 0.010 0.000
Construction spending 0.012 0.000 0.006 0.041 0.008 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.868 0.007 0.070
Durable orders 0.006 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.004 0.005 0.021 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.023 0.000
Factory orders 0.005 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.014 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.014 0.000
Consumer price index 0.016 0.000 0.001 0.356 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.929 0.016 0.000 0.004 0.031
Producer price index 0.004 0.001 0.009 0.000 0.003 0.072 0.002 0.650 0.004 0.025 0.008 0.022
Consumer confidence 0.009 0.000 0.001 0.721 0.006 0.000 0.010 0.001 0.008 0.000 0.017 0.000
Housing starts 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.029 0.003 0.027 0.001 0.747 0.004 0.012 0.034 0.000
ISM 0.013 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.016 0.000
Leading indicators 0.005 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.054 0.009 0.000 0.021 0.000
Initial claims 0.008 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.104 0.008 0.000 0.010 0.000
Nonfarm payrolls 0.070 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.070 0.000 0.033 0.000
Fed funds rate 0.097 0.000 0.139 0.000 0.102 0.000 0.121 0.000 0.077 0.000 0.126 0.000
Trade balance 0.027 0.000 0.002 0.399 0.022 0.000 0.004 0.178 0.022 0.000 0.003 0.438
Treasury budget 0.000 0.804 0.000 0.250 0.000 0.799 0.000 0.655 0.000 0.099 0.001 0.041
O Total p-val O Total p-val O Total p-val
Unscheduled News 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.000
Table 12
Volatility Model: US Cumulative News Response Coefficients (NBER recession dates: January 1, 2008 and June 30, 2009). This table presents the cumulative US
news response coefficients from the variance model (Eq. (5)). The news coefficients are cumulated over the two hour window following the news release. For
each currency pair, we run a pooled regression. The first (third) column presents the news surprise coefficients interacted with the crisis dummy (no-crisis
dummy). Following the NBER, we define the crisis period as the interval between January 1, 2008 and June 30, 2009.
USD/EUR USD/GBP USD/JPY
News variables No-crisis p-val Crisis p-val No-crisis p-val Crisis p-val No-crisis p-val Crisis p-val
Capacity utilization 0.001 0.974 0.198 0.060 0.080 0.029 0.040 0.737 0.032 0.392 0.258 0.029
GDP advanced report 0.363 0.000 0.013 0.703 0.316 0.000 0.109 0.007 0.347 0.000 0.105 0.016
GDP second report 0.103 0.001 0.082 0.045 0.121 0.003 0.154 0.004 0.131 0.001 0.210 0.000
GDP third report 0.043 0.117 0.059 0.263 0.002 0.953 0.024 0.679 0.179 0.017 0.323 0.026
Industrial production 0.008 0.787 0.074 0.437 0.091 0.011 0.005 0.963 0.055 0.149 0.369 0.001
Personal income 0.059 0.014 0.108 0.000 0.010 0.682 0.092 0.000 0.046 0.116 0.016 0.586
Retail sales 0.189 0.000 0.126 0.000 0.215 0.000 0.097 0.002 0.240 0.000 0.242 0.000
New home sales 0.055 0.000 0.108 0.083 0.030 0.029 0.041 0.548 0.106 0.000 0.213 0.012
Personal expenditure 0.003 0.853 0.193 0.002 0.022 0.232 0.230 0.001 0.003 0.897 0.176 0.017
Business inventories 0.027 0.085 0.114 0.000 0.018 0.281 0.038 0.217 0.014 0.446 0.164 0.000
Construction spending 0.135 0.000 0.064 0.041 0.092 0.000 0.130 0.000 0.004 0.868 0.073 0.070
Durable orders 0.078 0.000 0.398 0.000 0.049 0.005 0.281 0.000 0.094 0.000 0.306 0.000
Factory orders 0.061 0.000 0.090 0.001 0.054 0.001 0.185 0.000 0.086 0.000 0.192 0.000
Consumer price index 0.238 0.000 0.019 0.356 0.177 0.000 0.002 0.929 0.232 0.000 0.057 0.031
Producer price index 0.055 0.001 0.136 0.000 0.039 0.072 0.022 0.650 0.053 0.025 0.119 0.022
Consumer confidence 0.113 0.000 0.012 0.721 0.072 0.000 0.124 0.001 0.099 0.000 0.207 0.000
Housing starts 0.059 0.000 0.086 0.029 0.045 0.027 0.016 0.747 0.060 0.012 0.550 0.000
ISM 0.136 0.000 0.146 0.000 0.148 0.000 0.202 0.000 0.260 0.000 0.162 0.000
Leading indicators 0.066 0.000 0.132 0.000 0.061 0.001 0.066 0.054 0.128 0.000 0.291 0.000
Initial claims 0.109 0.000 0.087 0.000 0.062 0.000 0.029 0.104 0.115 0.000 0.138 0.000
Nonfarm payrolls 0.661 0.000 0.344 0.000 0.644 0.000 0.372 0.000 0.661 0.000 0.311 0.000
Fed funds rate 0.624 0.000 0.889 0.000 0.651 0.000 0.772 0.000 0.496 0.000 0.806 0.000
Trade balance 0.315 0.000 0.022 0.399 0.256 0.000 0.045 0.178 0.256 0.000 0.029 0.438
Treasury budget 0.002 0.804 0.026 0.250 0.002 0.799 0.010 0.655 0.026 0.099 0.078 0.041
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We examine an unusual episode in the behavior of the euro, pound and yen exchange rate markets when the dollar
appreciated (depreciated) against the three major currencies, in response to unfavorable (favorable) US growth news during
the global financial crisis. Contrary to the previous findings which suggest that the news effects switched sign indiscrimi-
nately for almost all major US macroeconomic indicators (Fratzscher, 2009), we show that only a handful of macro variables’
effect reversed sign. In particular, announcements related to consumption, housing, labor and credit markets, which were at
the epicenter of the crisis, exhibit sign asymmetry during this period, indicating a context-specific change in investors’ reac-
tion to news. The sign switch effect we document is present in all three markets, but weaker in the dollar-yen market.
We explore possible sources of the time variant exchange rate reaction to macro news over our sample period and con-
sider the explanations suggested by the literature. In particular, we find that the fluctuation in the aggregate risk level is the
primary factor driving the change in the news coefficient signs, specifically for consumption, real-estate and employment
related news items. We find that, as market risk increases, the dollar appreciation in response to a unit of positive US growth
news dampens. Fluctuations in carry trade returns matter mostly in the dollar-yen market.
Our findings highlight the context-specific nature of the change in investors’ reaction to news and reveal that announce-
ment chronology within an indicator category matters for the sign switch effect to take place. The documented sign reversal
in news reaction is context-specific because, in a given month, only those announcements that are the earliest releases
within an indicator category, which contain incremental information about consumption, real-estate and labor markets
reveal sign asymmetry. Considering the sources and the evolution of risk during the 2008–2009 financial crisis, it is rational
for investors to pay more attention to the signals in the earliest, most informative releases related to consumption, housing,
credit and employment, with the goal of gleaning new information about the potential risks relevant to these factors.
Overall, we find that investor sentiment and economic conditions has an important impact on currency return behavior.
During periods of elevated risk, traditional relationships between macroeconomic fundamentals and exchange rates may not
hold. Investors and financial institutions that hold and trade international assets as well as the managers of non-financial
corporations that participate in FX markets due to the nature and requirements of their businesses (such as importing,
exporting and hedging activities) should take into account the time-variant nature of announcement effects. By enhancing
our understanding of the behavior of exchange rates when there are significant fluctuations in risk conditions, this research
may help managers anticipate the likelihood and magnitude of a news impact on exchange rates during periods of high
uncertainty. It may also help traders and financial institutions improve their assessment of net returns on international
assets that involve FX conversion by illuminating the forces behind investor expectations that drive the relationship between
macroeconomic news and asset returns.
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